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Preface
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee

Much attention has been given to the dramatic rise of Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi as a statesman in the regional and
international political theaters since his electoral victory in May
2014. U.S. President Barack H. Obama’s latest visit to India in late
January was significant because it affirmed Washington’s
determination to forge an alliance with India against a rising
China. After a decade of antiterrorism efforts concentrated on
Central Asia and the Middle East, the U.S. has become an active
player in shaping the balance of power between China and India.
As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted in peace for
millennia with the Himalayas separating them. Political contacts
between ancient China and India were minimal. But culturally
Buddhism spread from India to China (and then to Korea and
Japan) and this religion completely transformed Chinese society
and culture.
As modern nation-states in the late twentieth century, with the
exception of the early 1950s, diplomatic relations between China
and India were characterized by border conflicts, regional rivalries
and strategic competition. Sino-Indian border conflicts resulted
from the rejection by Beijing of the British-drawn McMahon Line
of 1913–1914 separating India and Tibet, the flight of the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama to India after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, as
1
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well as the dispute following the 1962 border war in which China
seized 38,000 km2 of Indian territory in Aksai Chin, and another
5,180 km2 of northern Kashmir that Pakistan ceded to Beijing
under a 1963 pact. China has been keen to avoid confronting a
powerful India south of the Himalayas. Outraged by India’s
support of the creation of the Dalai Lama’s exiled government in
Dharamsala, Beijing responded by supporting Pakistan in the 1965
Indo-Pakistani War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, continuous
Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan indicated the close links
between Beijing and Islamabad.
The wider Cold War conflict greatly complicated Sino-Indian
relations, as shown by the Soviet alliance with India and U.S.
support for China from the 1970s onward. Despite the gradual
Sino-Indian rapprochement after the visit of the-then Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988, China refused to sacrifice
its strategic partnership with Pakistan. This “two-front threat” (i.e.,
Pakistan in the west and China in the north and northeast) gave
rise to Indian leaders’ worries about China’s containment policy.
Two security issues have affected the latest development of
Sino-Indian relations. One issue has to do with China’s concern
about the spread of Islamic extremism from Central Asia to
Xinjiang. An unstable Pakistan threatens the security of China’s
western frontier. In May 2009, several identifiable groups with alQaeda links attacked Chinese investors and workers in Pakistan.
Seeing the escalating instability in Pakistan, China worried about
the political vacuum left by the U.S. military withdrawal from
Central Asia and the use of Afghanistan as a training ground for
Islamic militants in its Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

2
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Another security issue concerns the Chinese naval expansion
into the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Since 2013, China has
launched a “Maritime Silk Route” initiative to establish a
comprehensive system of oceanic ports, harbor infrastructures,
and special economic zones in the South China Sea and the
northern

Indian

Ocean.

To

further

protect

its

lines

of

communication across the Indian and Pacific oceans, China has
constructed new ports, maritime communications, and overland
transport routes in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
In December 2011, China announced it would build an anti-piracy
naval base in the Seychelles to counter U.S. maritime power. All
these geostrategic efforts were designed to consolidate China’s
control over its extensive overland and maritime frontiers.
Indian policymakers always view China as an interloper in
South Asia, an external power that challenges India’s natural
sphere of influence. As a rising power, China perceives South Asia
as a legitimate area for flexing its muscles against India and the
U.S. In response to this Chinese encirclement, India has pursued
security relations with China’s neighbors in the Pacific Ocean,
especially Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan. As the global balance of
power is gradually shifting from China to the U.S. and its allies,
India will seize the opportunity to counter Chinese influence and
reclaim its status as a regional power. Evidently, both China and
India have adopted defensive security measures to balance against
each other in the wider Asian region.
Against this geopolitical backdrop, this occasional paper has
three essays written by professors from Pace University and
Nanjing Normal University that address a host of structural
3
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challenges facing China and India in pursuit of sustainable
development in the early twenty-first century. Pan Zhen gives a
critical overview of China’s economic policies, and finds the topdown development model to be fraught with tensions. Joseph TseHei Lee argues that the ability of China to pursue sustainable
growth and social betterment is largely contingent upon many
circumstantial factors, especially the negative attributes of
globalization and the rise of domestic discontents. Satish K. Kolluri
shifts the focus of discussion to the electoral victory of Narendra
Modi in India, and examines the implications of the rise of Modi in
domestic and regional politics.
Taken together, these essays throw light on the political and
socioeconomic trajectories of China and India. Since both countries
have significantly liberalized their economies in recent decades,
the unprecedented expansion of their capabilities and influences is
a complex phenomenon, rooted in the context of particular
temporal and spatial settings, and the need to accommodate
endogenous and exogenous forces of change.

4
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The Change and Development of China’s
Economic Policies

Pan Zhen

Since China launched its modernization program in 1978, the
national economy has experienced an unprecedented level of
growth for decades. The top-down policies from the central
government constituted a major driving force of development. 1
This

article

examines

the

institutional

mechanisms

and

performance of Chinese economic reforms. It highlights some of
the challenges in China’s quest for sustainable development and
provides several policy suggestions to strengthen the country’s
reform efforts.

China’s Reform Policies Since 1978
China’s reform policies entailed economic restructuring at six
levels. First was the transformation of rural economy. China
initially restructured the agricultural sector with cautious
experiments in selected locations.

2

The central government

abolished the Maoist system of people’s communes built on
egalitarianism, implemented the household contract responsibility
system, and established a legal mechanism to circulate land among
rural residents. Farmers were liberated from the daunting
constraints of agrarian work and provided cheap labor for the
5
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township industrial enterprises. Second was the “open-door”
policy that set up Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen to attract foreign investment in 1980.
The number of SEZ increased to fourteen coastal cities in May 1984
including Dalian and Qinhuangdao in northern China. During the
1990s, major cities along the Yangtze River like Chongqing and
Wuhan, along with thirteen border cities, were opened to foreign
trade. This multi-directional and multi-layered strategy was
designed to integrate Chinese coastal and inland industries into
the global production chain.
The third area concerned the reform of ownership structure.
While China vigorously developed the private sector, it
established a mixed economic system to accommodate the
longstanding form of public ownership. This not only enabled the
government authorities of all levels to improve the efficiency of
state-owned enterprises, but also provided support to the vibrant
private sector.3 The fourth area had to do with the reform of price
system. The state controlled the commodity price during the
Maoist era. The reform gave rise to a double-track pricing system,
enabling the government and market to regulate the supply of
goods and services.4
Fifth was the reform of financial system. Starting from 1979, the
central government broke the monopoly of the People’s Bank of
China as the only banking institution in the country, and
permitted the formation of commercial banks. It also implemented
a system of foreign currency exchange. There used to be a dualexchange rate system for Chinese currency. Foreigners and
overseas Chinese were not permitted to own yuan. They had to
exchange their hard currency for the foreign exchange certificates
6
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at the People’s Bank of China and redeem them at state-run stores.
On January 1, 1994, China unified the dual-exchange rate system
to strengthen the economy. The last area concerned the reform of
taxation. Under the old taxation system, only the central
government was permitted to collect and distribute tax uniformly.
The new taxation system allowed the central and local authorities
to specify their respective expenses by creating new tax codes. This
arrangement gave the local officials incentive to attract domestic
and international investment in various development projects. The
competition between different regions to attract investment
contributed to the reduction of economic gaps between coastal and
inland areas.

The Chinese Economic Miracle
The reform policies completely transformed China’s economy.
From 1978 onward, China experienced continuous economic
growth for thirty-five years. The overall gross national income
(GNI) increased from 364.52 billion yuan in 1978 to 47.21 trillion
yuan in 2011, a growth of almost 130 times. Its gross domestic
product (GDP) reached US$8.36 trillion in 2012, making China the
world’s second largest economy after the U.S. It had the world’s
largest foreign exchange reserves, holding a total amount of
US$1.9 trillion in 2008 and US$3.31 trillion in 2012. Its inward
foreign direct investment (FDI) outperformed all the development
countries and reached US$111.72 billion in 2012, making the
country the world’s second largest market for FDI for the last
nineteen years. It was also the largest trading nation in the world,
and its total volume of imports and exports reached US$3.867
trillion in 2012. These statistics confirmed the success of
modernization and contributed to China’s rise to prominence in
7
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global economy.
Institutionally, China’s success owed much to its social and
political stability, an integrated system of public and private
property rights, and its strong Communist leadership. Ever since
the beginning of the modernization, China put in place a system of
property rights, welcomed foreign investment, and laid a solid
microeconomic foundation for growth. It also redoubled the
efforts to deregulate economic rules, embrace more free-market
principles, and permit greater autonomy for state-owned and
private enterprises. The enterprises took advantage of the cheap
and abundant labor force to expand manufacturing, and launched
new products and services to compete with one another. The
success of the enterprises ensured decades of stability and
prosperity.
From the demand side, high investment and foreign trade
accelerated China’s growth. Local authorities employed probusiness policies, providing investors with cheap land and little
environmental supervision. China also adhered to the exportoriented strategy as Japan and South Korea had done. It
deliberately kept its currency undervalued and gave subsidies to
export-oriented enterprises. Global economy maintained a good
momentum of growth before 2008 and created countless
opportunities for China. As a result, Chinese export expanded
steadily from its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2001 to the global financial crisis in 2008, with the compound
growth rate of export being over 20%.

8
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Challenges Facing Chinese Economy
The Chinese economy, however, has encountered a series of
structural problems, the first one being an inner imbalance of
demand

and

supply.

Although

the

overall

consumption,

investment, and net exports have increased, the rate of
consumption growth is significantly lower than other developed
and developing nations. From 1980 to 2011, the rate of
consumption growth fell from 65.5% to 49.1% of China’s GDP,
when the investment rate increased from 34.8% to 48.3%. Worse
still, the ratio of private consumption declined sharply, reaching
less than 60% of the country’s GDP, whereas that ratio in other
was about 60%. Another problem is China’s heavy dependence on
investment. The overall investment rate almost reached 50% of
China’s GDP, the highest in the world, and the rates of most
countries were usually between 30% and 40%. Under the massive
economic stimulus policies in 2008, China’s investment rate is
bound to rise in the coming years. These figures indicate that the
Chinese economy has been heavily dependent on foreign trade
and high trade surplus. From 2003 to 2008, more than half of
China’s GDP was driven by foreign trade, and from 2005 to 2007,
that figure reached over 60%. Due to the aftermaths of the 2008
global financial crisis, the figure fell down to 43.7% in 2009, but
rebound to 50.1% in 2011. In this perspective, China has been
extremely vulnerable to any fluctuations in the global economy.
Equally problematic is the unfair distribution system in China.
At the beginning of the economic reform, the national government
favored pragmatism over ideology. It “gave priority to efficiency
with due consideration to fairness” (效率优先, 兼顾公平 xiaolu
youxian, jiangu gongping) and “let some of the people get rich first”
(让一些人先富起来 rang yixie ren xianfu qilai). Through tax refunds
9
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and subsides, the state supported entrepreneurs and middle-class
professionals, and tolerated the widening gap between the rich
and the poor, and the occasional outbreaks of popular discontent.
The percentage of national fiscal revenue grew faster than the
overall GDP for many years. After the national taxation system
reform in 1995, the rate of government expenses reached as high as
23% of its GDP in 2012.
Shortly after the global financial crisis, the entire world entered
a period of structural readjustment. Many countries strove to
control trade deficit, and some countries embraced protectionism
to save domestic industries. This made it extremely difficult for
China to grow its economy by relying on foreign trade.5 Moreover,
the Chinese system of allocating investment resources was far
from perfect. The material returns from massive investment in
infrastructure declined sharply, and there was a limited scope for
investment-driven growth.
Because of the appreciation of yuan and the rise of labor cost,
Chinese export-oriented industries became less competitive.
Cheap labor force was used to drive the growth of labor-intensive
industries during the 1980s and 1990s. But since 2005, there has
been a problem of labor shortage, partly because of a hard-toreverse trend of demographic decline caused by the one-child
policy, and partly because of the limited supply of new labor from
the countryside.
Furthermore, more and more local governments could not
afford to offer cheap land to attract investment. As the real estate
market heated up, the value of the land was astronomically high in
the metropolitan cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and
10
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Chongqing, as well as many second- and third-tier cities. Although
the real estate development brought in avenues for the local
authorities, land expropriation and demolition were costly
undertakings.

Therefore,

many

governments

in

China’s

southeastern provinces no longer provided the manufacturing
sector with cheap land to build factories. In addition, rapid
development consumed excessive resources and led to serious
unethical business conducts. Pollution, environmental degradation,
food safety problems, and business credit abuse troubled
everyone.6 Despite its spectacular hardware and infrastructure, the
development model of China’s economy is not sustainable.

Structural Adjustment of the Economy in the 11th FiveYear Plan (2006–2010; 五年计划 wunian jihua)
To overcome these obstacles, the central government implemented
numerous measures of macroeconomic control. These measures
included the simultaneous contraction of fiscal and monetary
policies, the control of overheating investment, the continuing
appreciation of yuan, the elimination of foreign trade preferential
arrangement, the regulation of export-oriented industries, the
cancellation of agricultural tax to raise farmers’ income, and the
tightening of high energy-consuming investment and construction
projects. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the government
loosed the constraints on investment, launched numerous
infrastructure projects to stimulate domestic demand, and raised
the level of consumption through tax cuts. These strategies
enabled China to recover quicker than the rest of the world.
Unfortunately, the stimulus policies had shortcomings. They
failed to transform the export-oriented economy into a new
11
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growth model. Because a significant portion of the consumptiongenerated profits came from the stimulus policies, the overall rate
of domestic consumption actually declined. In 2009, domestic
consumption contributed 45.4% to China’s GDP, the highest
percentage since 2002. But the consumption activities only pulled
4.1% of the GDP growth, and this was the lowest percentage since
2005. The domestic consumption growth largely resulted from the
state’s campaigns of purchasing home appliances for peasants,
exchanging cash for clunkers, and reducing vehicle purchase tax.
Similarly, the rapid increase of China’s overall investment rate
worsened the problem of structural imbalance. In 2009, the foreign
and domestic investment contributed 95.2% to China’s GDP and
pulled 8.9% of the GDP growth, the highest rate in two decades.
Yet, the investment rate began to fall in 2010.During the 11th fiveyear-plan (2006–2010), China made little progress in adjusting its
industrial

structure.

Economic

growth

still

depended

on

manufacturing, and there was little expansion in the service sector.

Economic Policies of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015)
The central government was determined to expand consumption
in the 12th five-year plan, focusing on the promotion of
employment and entrepreneurship, the increase of urban and rural
residents’ income, the standardization of a minimum wage, and
the institutionalization of a salary raise structure for enterprise
employees. These tactics were designed to empower consumers as
a means of growing the economy.
With respect to industrial restructuring, the government
favored the construction of technological parks, supported seven
strategic industries (i.e., environmental industry, new information
12
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technology, biotechnology, new energy, new energy vehicles,
high-ended equipment manufacturing, and new industrial
materials), and promoted the service sector. In the area of public
services, the government sought to equalize the living standards in
urban and rural areas, relocate rural residents to cities, and
modernize public facilities in the countryside.
This new plan marks a clear departure from the previous focus
on urban economic growth. As the central government invests
more resources in public welfare and rural development, it
formalizes this criterion as a new assessment of the local officials’
performance. The aggressive plans to capitalize on emerging new
industries may contribute to economic growth, but the old
problem of imbalance between demand and supply has yet to be
resolved. Urbanization may become a powerful weapon to
stimulate consumption and adjust the economic structure.7 But the
central government has yet to outline concrete plans to make this
idea a reality. There have been numerous reports of the local
authorities forcing peasants to sell their land below the market
price in the name of the urbanization.

Conclusion
This article concludes with four policy suggestions to deepen
China’s reform efforts. First, the government should reduce its
intervention into micro-economy. It should instead push private
enterprises and foreign companies to get involved in more
industries, and guide state-owned enterprises to carry out their
own structural upgrading. In recent years, the economic
intervention policies by the central and local authorities betrayed
social fairness and market efficiency. The state should employ
13
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fiscal and tax policies to optimize the industrial structure, and
assist technologically advanced industries against inefficient ones.
It should not impose administrative commands on entrepreneurs
and interfere in the daily operation of business enterprises.
Meanwhile, the government authorities should eliminate the
official monopoly in certain industries and invite private capital to
the playing field.8
Second, the central government should liberalize the capital
market. The marketization of interest rate and the diversification
of capital market would enable China to restructure its vast
financial service system in urban and rural areas, open access to
capital for small businesses, accelerate the development of private
financial institutions, and strengthen the supervision of the
shadow banking system. The state should regulate the securities
market by making it more transparent. A feasible option was to
improve the management boards of small and medium-sized
enterprises, making them more accountable.
Third, the central government ought to reform the fiscal system,
and redefine the financial authorities and obligations of the central
and local governments. China should correct the current problem
that all levels of intergovernmental property rights and official
obligations are asymmetrical. It is not feasible for the central
government to receive all fiscal revenues from the local authorities
and assume little responsibility toward the citizens. The key is to
strengthen the consumption tax as a means of leading the local
authorities to push policies beneficial to consumers. Another
option is to adjust the individual income tax levy standard in
order to alleviate income inequality.

14
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Finally, the government must invest in public welfare, and let
the public to have a say in the debate about welfare allocation.
China would not necessarily become a welfare state at the moment
because the tax burden of its citizens is quite low on average, but
they receive limited public services. A nationwide social security
system has not been fully established to address the worries of
urban and rural residents. Despite the repeated promises to
improve people’s livelihoods, the government has yet to back their
words with actions. In fact, access to public welfare is often
determined by one’s sociopolitical privilege. The only solution is
to implement a fair and equal welfare system for all. This helps
transform the current system of compensation welfare into that of
general welfare beneficial to all social sectors. Only by doing so
will the central government cultivate a sense of economic security
among its citizens.
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China’s Economic Reforms at a Critical Junction
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee

Effective management of resources is key to a country’s
development. This

is

particularly true for China, which

experienced double-digit growth over the last two decades. As
China celebrated the 120th anniversary of the birth of former
leader Mao Zedong (毛泽东) in December 2013, there has been
much discussion about the future of the nation in the twenty-first
century.1 Building on Pan Zhen’s critique of the Chinese economy,
this article examines some important reform policies that have
produced the economic miracle since the 1980s, and highlights a
number of governance crises facing the new Communist
leadership today.

Historicizing the Chinese Economic Miracle
Since its founding on October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of
China was neither a reproduction of the Soviet Union model nor
an incarnation of the ancient Confucian empire. The Chinese
Communist Party distinguished itself from previous regimes by
extending its political power to control society, economy and
national culture. The Maoist regime tightened control at all levels,
dominating political, social, economic and cultural domains.
However, everything changed following a series of important
political moments. The most notorious movement was the
Cultural Revolution, lasting from 1966 to 1976, that was launched
17

Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.16
to activate popular radicalism in support of Mao Zedong, but
almost brought down the regime. The state only survived this
movement by effectively suppressing the popular outpourings
that Mao had encouraged. Since then, communism as a unifying
ideology collapsed and pragmatism prevailed under Deng
Xiaoping (邓小平) and his successors. Since the 1980s, economic
growth has become the people’s common hope and desire, and
thus the only collective value supporting the legitimacy of the
People’s Republic.
Under Deng’s leadership, the Communist state relied on
several institutional mechanisms to create a fast-growing
economy. First, China integrated itself into the global economy
since the implementation of reform and open-door policies in the
1980s and its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
November 2001. This enabled China to attract foreign capital to
modernize its industrial infrastructure, and to apply international
business

regulations

to

transform

domestic

socioeconomic

practices.2 Second, profitmaking was standardized in every level
of the Chinese economy and held as the major criterion for
assessing the performance of both state and private business
enterprises. The quest for profits gave rise to a strong culture of
business competition and this was essential for sustaining China’s
spectacular economic growth.
Third, there emerged a new entrepreneurial class or what
Bruce J. Dickson (2003) calls “red capitalists.” 3 This class was
initially composed of Communist Party leaders and state officials,
ex-officials, their relatives and friends, but it took on a life of its
own and became a powerful non-state sector with its own
agendas. The Chinese state coopted this fast-growing sector by
18
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admitting entrepreneurs into the Communist Party in 2001. As a
result, these “red capitalists” had no intention to subvert the oneparty state as the West had hoped. Instead they supported the
status quo and played a stabilizing role in times of crises. For
example, many entrepreneurs donated large sums of money to
support the state’s relief efforts in the recent deadly earthquake in
the southwestern province of Sichuan (四川) on May 12, 2008.
Fourth, China’s rise to prominence in the world economy
increased its influence in global politics, which was dominated by
Western nations for the past two centuries. As the U.S. is trapped
in two costly military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, China
has developed strategic alliances with many developing countries
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, the six-party nuclear talks, and the
WTO. Giovanni Arrighi argues that the U.S. military campaigns in
Iraq and Afghanistan not only undermined the neoconservatives’
imperial project of building a new American century of world
dominance, but also made China the true winner of the U.S. “War
on Terror.”4 Fareed Zakaria calls this development the beginning
of “the post-American world,” in which the U.S. retreats, and the
rest of the world advances in economic power and political
influence.5

Governance Crises and Domestic Discontents
Combining a market economy with authoritarian rule, Chinese
Communist leaders have adapted certain tenets of capitalism such
as opening to foreign investment, deregulating the labor market
and building infrastructure, while maintaining firm control over
the government, military, public security and media information.
19
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Nevertheless, accompanying China’s economic miracle are
authoritarianism and domestic unrest. It is important to explore
four institutional obstacles confronting the new Communist
leadership today.
First, China’s rise is fraught with paradoxes and contradictions,
and has destabilized domestic politics. As Beijing failed to resolve
maritime sovereignty disputes with neighbors like Japan, the
Philippines, and Vietnam through peaceful negotiation, many
netizens organized protests to express their nationalist sentiments
and destroyed foreign factories in China. The waves of
nationalism have swept across the country with the public outcry
for sanctions against foreign countries and the hostile remarks by
commanders of the People’s Liberation Army. The widespread
“China can say No” attitude has prevented the Chinese leaders
from embracing new diplomatic initiatives to solve the territorial
disputes.
Second,
journalists,

hostility
and

towards

ethnic

liberal

minorities

intellectuals,
continues

in

critical
China.

Imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波),
persecution of Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims, and
forced exile of dissidents show that the state has tightened its grip
upon the citizenry despite its rhetoric of tolerance and
compassion. In Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai (薄熙来), son of
revolutionary hero Bo Yibo ( 薄 一 波 ), gained much attention
employing Maoist rhetoric and state-sponsored welfare projects
for political gain. In Beijing, Zhou Yongkang (周永康), who once
controlled the national public security forces, was purged in Xi
Jinping’s (习近平) anti-corruption campaigns.6 With the downfall
of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the Communist leadership has
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demonstrated its awkwardness in resolving the contradictions of
both Maoist past and reformist present. Displays of assertiveness
and confidence occur, moreover, with rising discontents that
inhibit real self-assertiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis,
Chinese leaders have recognized the need to transform its exportled economy into one driven by domestic consumption.
Nevertheless, the political crises in the wake of the dismissal of Bo
Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the leadership succession, the anticorruption campaigns, and the pro-democracy protests in Hong
Kong discouraged any officials from tackling these structural
problems and experimenting liberal reforms.
Third, the reality of an economic slowdown in China suggests
that the Communist leadership can no longer appeal to its people
with material incentives. China today has to confront many
negative attributes of globalization. Unprecedented growth gave
China a temporary reprieve but the national economy has slowed
down and the state has yet to offer a sustainable developmental
strategy. According to Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, the
state refused to transfer power to entrepreneurs and financial
professionals,

while

ruling

elites

mainly

used

state-run

commercial banks to drive growth that covered up nonperforming
debts and distorted the value of bank assets.7 Whereas sustainable
growth required China’s consumers to buy more local products,
urging a massive transfer of wealth to the citizenry in order to do
so, the state did the opposite by increasing spending on fixed
investment. The injection of stimulus money into state-owned
enterprises and large infrastructure projects was not sustainable.
Since late 2011, many private enterprises have been bankrupt
because they lacked the political connections to secure bank loans
that could resolve their cash flow problems. Whether or not China
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postpones a crisis for the time being, the days of being perceived
as the world’s economic miracle are numbered.
Finally, market liberalization is a double-edged sword. The
rapidity with which the state has achieved growth has created
tensions and conflicts at all levels. Extremely efficient and highly
urban, China’s development has yielded growth rates above those
of most developed nations. But its new wealth is unevenly
distributed, its labor market ruthless, and its living environment
Dickensian. Political scientist Barrington Moore remarked several
decades ago, “The tragic fact of the matter is that the poor bear the
heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist and capitalist
systems. The only justification for imposing the costs is that they
would become steadily worse off without it.”

8

Because of

explosive grievances caused by the state’s aggressive development
strategies and reluctance to liberalize its authoritarian system, a
rising China that denies its citizens what they desire—such as job
security,

healthcare,

gender

equality

and

freedom—drives

discontented sections of society to mobilize for collective action in
order to guarantee security, solace and justice. Popular protest has
become a prominent mode of political participation, and the
dangers of ineffective governance will be reflected internally. As
many as 180,000 strikes, demonstrations and protests were
reported in 2010. This is an average of 493 incidents per day. This
official figure indicates a dramatic increase from the 90,000
incidents documented in 2006 and fewer than 9,000 in the mid1990s.9 In particular, the railway station massacre in Kunming (昆
明) on March 1, 2014 revealed the spread of interethnic unrest
from China’s far-western Muslim-majority Xinjiang region (新疆)
to other parts of the country, and the deadly explosion in Urumqi
on May 22, 2014 suggested the increased militancy of some
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Uyghur activists against Beijing. 10 The Umbrella Revolution in
Hong Kong, a civil disobedience campaign that demanded
universal suffrage in elections for the chief executive and
legislators, became a major test of crisis management for Xi
Jinping. All these obstacles are exacerbated by many explosive
factors such as a lack of prosperity, high inflation and
unemployment rates, rampant corruption and incompetent
government that is devoid of democratic legitimacy. The fear of
internal instability may prompt the top leadership to concentrate
on stability maintenance rather than external power projection.

Conclusion
Keenly aware of these governance crises, the Communist leaders
introduced new policies in March 2014 to continue the reform
efforts without hindering growth. These measures permitted the
local authorities to resolve financial deficits by issuing bonds, the
national currency yuan to fluctuate widely in offshore exchange,
and ordinary farmers to buy and sell their land-use rights to
urbanities. The central government also adjusted the target of
economic growth from 7.7% in 2013 to about 7.5% in 2014,
suggesting that the leaders were as much concerned about keeping
the rate of growth to reduce unemployment as implementing
radical policies that would undermine the country’s long-term
economic prospects.11
In the final analysis, China is confronting the negative aspects
of economic liberalization. As the nation is trapped in a perceptual
cycle of popular discontent, time seems to be running out for Xi
Jinping to resolve these internal grievances and place the country
on the right track.
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Deconstructing the Dramatic Rise of Narendra
Modi in the Global Political Theater

Satish K. Kolluri

A New Political Landscape of India
On May 16, 2014, Narendra Damodardas Modi (or NaMo as he is
called by his supporters) became the first Indian Prime Minister to
be born after independence in 1947. By stating that he was chosen
by God and Mother Ganges to fight the dynastic misrule of the
Indian National Congress (INC) during his campaign speeches,
Modi’s scale of victory and the mandate that he derived from the
electoral results across the linguistically and culturally diverse
states of India stunned his followers and critics alike. The tragic
irony of the front page picture of Modi arranging a photo frame of
Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) in his new office on his first day of
work was not lost on the more discerning in that it was Nathuram
Godse (1910–1949), a member of the radical Hindu revivalist
organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National
Voluntary Organization), who assassinated the Mahatma on
January 20th, 1948. The very same RSS provided a political home to
a young Narendra Modi by inculcating in him the ethos of
“Hindutva” or “Hindu-ness” which insists that multi-religious,
multicultural, and multiethnic India is fundamentally a “Hindu
Rashtra” or “Hindu Nation.” The victory of Modi’s Bharatiya
Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) in itself was not a surprise.
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Some

opinion

polls

carried

out

by

mainstream

media

organizations had predicted the number of seats the party that
were close enough to the real number of 283, which secured an
absolute majority for the BJP.
Predictably the Indian nation went into a celebratory mode and
felt immense pride in pulling off the most successful election
logistically in the nation’s history and in the world’s largest
democracy even as the secular progressive and left forces suffered
one of their heaviest political defeats in recent memory. For some,
the fall of the INC-led coalition government brought relief from
the dysfunctional and corrupt politics and practices that it
symbolized. The Indian media left no stone unturned in joining
the celebrations because they were more than responsible for
bringing Modi into the living rooms of millions of Indians, not to
mention his brand of being a visionary, an economic reformer who
would bring in much-needed foreign investment and a proud
Indian who will protect small business interests from the
predatory

behavior

of

multinational

corporations.

Modi’s

prostration on the steps of Parliament on his first ever visit to the
building and that too, as the Prime Minister-designate was a
perfect ‘made for television’ moment. The Indian Election was
projected to cost US$5billion, the most expensive in the country’s
electoral history and second only to the U.S Presidential Election
in 2012 which cost US$7 billion. “The huge sum marks India’s
entrance into big-time election expenditures as well as the
emergence of sophisticated Western-style campaigning, fundraising and the domination of social media in politics.”1 In view of
the difficult road he had to take in order to evenly remotely appear
Prime Ministerial in the minds of the voters and in editorial rooms
of mainstream media, Modi, like most well-known rightwing
26

China and India: Globalization with Different Paths
ideologues of past and present, crafted a cleaver and brilliant
campaign that was as relentless as it was effective when it came to
using traditional and social media in a massive publicity and
advertising blitzkrieg that softened up his image to an extent, and
helped him gravitate from the face of extreme right politics of
Hindu cultural nationalism of the RSS to the moderate center-right
space that BJP has traditionally occupied. The media bias theory
floated by Modi’s supporters about how his candidacy was being
sabotaged during the campaign by the “anti-Modi” media for his
“alleged” role in the Gujarat riots did not hold up to the critical
scrutiny of skeptics who argued that the bias itself could have
been a strategic construction by Team Modi to play the victim card
in order to elicit sympathy from the voting public.2
There is no dearth of critics of Narendra Modi across the world
because they have neither been able to forget nor forgive him for
the decisions that he consciously took or actions he did not
deliberately take, or at the very least take moral responsibility as
the Chief Executive of the State of Gujarat. In a chilling response to
a question on why the riots in his state had reached such horrific
proportions, Modi in an half nod to Isaac Newton (1642–1727)
said, “Every action has a reaction.” Consequently, the newest
leader of the world’s largest democracy could not travel to the
world’s oldest democracy because he was denied a visa to the U.S.
by the State Department under George W. Bush in 2002 as he was
held morally and legally responsible for presiding over the horrors
inflicted on Muslims in a pogrom that was coded as “an
experiment” in which the State of Gujarat functioned as the
“laboratory.” He was reviled and ostracized nationally and
internationally except by his own Hindu BJP who accused his
critics of demonizing him. Yet, in a span of a decade, Modi has
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arrived in a spectacular and surreal fashion as the Prime Minister
of India by campaigning on the vexed issues of development and
governance and leading his own party to a clear majority in the
Indian Parliament, despite receiving only 31 percent of the vote
share nationally. This outcome also decimated the INC to an extent
that the BJP does not have a coherent parliamentary opposition to
launch any meaningful challenge to its legislations and policies. In
a brilliant profile on Modi in 2010, Vinod K. Jose deconstructs
Modi’s personality and politics and reveals his ways of dealing
with dissent and disloyalty thus giving new meaning to “the
personal is political”: “Ten years after the anti-Muslim pogroms
that killed more than 1,200 Gujaratis, Modi has managed to bury
the past and resurrect his own extinct prospects for political
advancement, replacing epithets like “fascist,” “mass murderer,”
and “Hindutva fanatic” with a title of his own choosing: Vikaas
Purush, or Development Man.”3
Such an electoral mandate will not rid Narendra Modi of the
demons that he has repressed anytime soon, a man who is known
to be as secretive as he is authoritarian. As the Prime Minister of
all Indians irrespective of caste and creed, Modi has much hard
work to do ahead to heal the fractures and find political and
personal redemption for his misdeeds that were conveniently
cleared by the Investigative Agencies appointed by the highest
court in the land, even as it became clear that Modi was being
projected as the Prime Ministerial Candidate by the BJP. 4 In
response to the “clean chit” given to Modi, activists on the ground,
critics and scholars alike produced counterevidence that was
damning of the verdict issued by the Supreme Court which
refused to listen to any plea in this highly controversial matter.5
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A detailed documentation of the nexus between the growing
radicalization of Gujarat when Modi became Chief Minister and
the sources of funding from the Indian diaspora that helped this
process was performed by secular progressive groups under the
umbrella of a global movement, “The Campaign to Stop Funding
Hate” (www.stopfundinghate.org) to combat the insidious
propaganda and misinformation launched by the Modi’s machine
to dilute the death, suffering, and trauma suffered by Muslims of
Gujarat which were bravely captured by noted documentary
filmmaker Rakesh Sharma in his gut-wrenching and spine chilling
film, “The Final Solution: Gujarat genocide of minorities in India.”6

A Critique of Modi’s Campaign Rhetoric:
From Self-Rule to Good Governance
It is important to note that during the course of his campaign in
2014, Modi, ably aided by global public relations and advertising
firms was partly successful in burying the horrific memories of the
Gujarat riots in the national consciousness over time, and
reinvented himself as a man who as state’s chief administrator
brought

about

“economic

development”

through

“smart

governance.” His simple campaign message “Good days are to
come” in the context of the outrage and deep cynicism that voters
expressed against the Indian National Congress which ruled India
for most of its post-independent history worked extremely
effectively. That most of the Indian media had been euphoric
about the “Modi-wave” sweeping through the nation is an
understatement as it played a proactive role in getting Modi
elected as was seen in traditional and social media. Many Indians
wholeheartedly subscribed to Modi’s promises of all round
economic growth and effective governance, and this advanced this
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efforts to apply the “Gujarat model of development” to the rest of
the country.
Modi’s

cultural

roots

in

the

Hindu

extremist

parent

organization of RSS that believes in a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu
State) make him the first Indian Prime Minister who is openly
connected with an organization that emphasizes Hindu-Muslim
divisions, and perpetually “others” the latter as second-class
citizens because they do not authentically belonging to an
essentially Hindu nation.
Drawing from Barack H. Obama’s campaign playbook for
honing his outreach to voters on social media and proving to be
very successful at that, and from the Republican Party for his
belief in small government and neo-liberal economic policies
combined with the notion of Swadeshi (indigenous economic
policies), Modi’s strong messaging and the frequent rendition of
his personal narrative of being from a “backward caste” and
starting his work life as a tea seller at a railway station, and being a
complete outsider to “the establishment of Delhi” in vehement
opposition to the politically entrenched and so-called pseudosecular” Gandhi family, resonated deeply across large swathes of
urban, middle-class Indian voters across the nation, who embraced
his aspirational “middle-class” story to heart. By winning in a
decisive way, some like Santosh Desai who is a social
commentator and branding expert gave voice to Modi’s stunning
victory at the polls in context:
The politics spawned by Nehruvian liberalism has evoked a
simmering sense of rage. For some time now, the self-described
cultural mainstream has been seething at what they see as the
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contemptuous rejection of their way of life and their ideals by a
group that deals in ideas that have no natural cultural
resonance with the Indian reality. The fault line is essentially a
cultural one—democracy has been seen as a vehicle that has
served to impose a new set of ideals with an alien vocabulary
on a passive majority.7
In attempting to capture the rage and alienation felt by the “selfdescribed cultural mainstream” (i.e., Hindu mainstream) brought
about by Nehruvian liberals, Desai represents Modi and Nehru as
two sides of a culture war in India, where on the one side, the
inheritors of Nehruvian liberalism see themselves as liberals
invested in issues like anti-casteism, fair treatment of minorities,
and social and economic justice that the socialist-democraticsecular State embodies. Desai’s ambiguous use of “cultural
mainstream” finds form in the new India promised by Modi
government as “benign majoritarianism, where the majoritarian is
imagined not merely in terms of religion but in all aspects of
reality as it exists (and) nation as a formulation—the notion of
‘India First’ is shorthand for existing reality with its structure and
way of life intact.”8
A critical reading of this “benign majoritarianism” is to
compare it to a nationalist vision that is not merely bound by the
geographical and cultural identity of “Bharat” that not only rejects
alien vocabulary, but is marked by a timeless cultural heritage
which is central to all religions, languages and castes, and thus
constitutes a discourse of cultural nationalism that seeks to
“Indianize, Spiritualize, and Nationalize” the nation in the form of
Hindtuva that does not practice minority appeasement in the
name of “pseudo-secularism” that progressives are accused of,
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that actively supports laws that criminalize “sedition” and
“homosexuality” or attempts to relegate the figure of the Indian
woman to tradition and domesticity by coding her as “the inner or
spiritual identity” of the Hindu nation.
Political candidates in democratic elections usually campaign
from the extremes to consolidate their political base, and then
gradually move to the center in order to appeal to a much larger
base, and more importantly, appear to have the ability to govern.
During the course of his campaign, Narendra Modi did just that
by lacerating the Congress Party’s rule in language that effectively
tapped into the rapidly growing negative sentiments about the
Gandhi family, which was entrusted the newly independent
nation under its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889—
1964). In calling the party a crowd around a family in other words,
Modi notes in his campaign speeches: “Congress is a party that has
sacrificed the interests of the nation for the interests of one family.
To take the country forward is not in the nature of the Congress, it
is not in their blood. When we got freedom from the British, we
got Swarajya (Self-Rule) and when free ourselves from the
Congress, we will get Surajya (Good Governance).” 9 In an
insightful rhetorical analysis of Modi’s campaign speeches, Nonica
Dutta explains,
Modi’s language shapes a new political public sphere of power
and domination to manufacture consent among his karyakartas
(party workers). His rhetoric against the Congress, his model of
a “grand state and nation,” his confidence in the “mass base” of
his karyakartas, his stubborn faith in development and
progress are the recurring themes in his vocabulary. Listening
to him one notices that though his script is almost
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stereotypically repetitive, his repertoire carries a new gesture
each time he speaks. His language is interspersed with humor
and sarcasm; but no ironies. With the approaching 2014 general
elections, his speech at his premier political organization is full
of contradictions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, silences. Modi’s
language, this may be noticed in almost all his recent speeches,
camouflages much than reveals.10
Brand Modi was successful in convincing the urban middleclass voters and youth that the only way for India to move
forward was to recognize that the true meaning of Swarajya (SelfRule) could only be achieved through Surajya (Good Governance).
But the challenges facing India’s new Prime Minister are daunting
because Modi has to rule against the backdrop of a volatile
economy that has not seen the best of times over the past six years.
He has to move from campaign mode to governance mode, and
confront the inevitable clash between forces of free enterprise and
neo-liberalization on the one side, and the role of a socialist
welfare state on the other, keeping in mind the acute income
inequality that is only getting worse in India and the rest of the
world.

Conclusion
In

precisely

being

ambiguous,

inconsistent,

silent

and

contradictory about his messaging, be it a simultaneous gesture
towards neoliberal economic development on the one hand, and
“Swadeshi” (Made-in-India Model) on the other, Modi with his
style of authoritarian governance appealed to a critical cross
section of

voters, ranging from the urban industrialists,

entrepreneurs, and rural farming elites to the middle-class
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computer programmers and working-class taxi drivers. Millions of
Indians voted for Modi irrespective of who their local candidates
were.
The marketing of brand Modi was seen as an unprecedented
effort in the history of Indian politics, not just in the realm of
product marketing, but any form of marketing where it was all
about him only. Team Modi that drew technocratic talents from
the Indian diaspora left no stone unturned. They were relentless in
their selling of brand Modi and by the end of the six month
campaign, his team had covered 600,000 villages, almost every
urban and semi-urban household, every TV set, cellphone, radio
and even social media. They in all constituted the 31 percent of
voters in favor of Modi’s BJP, and this outcome gave the party a
majority in the Parliament, thus ending the practice of coalition
dharma in Indian politics for now at least.
Whether Modi will subscribe to the above-mentioned
rightwing ideology which constitutes the bedrock of the RSS and
its more “moderate” faced BJP in the public sphere, is open to
debate. He has formed a small cabinet of twenty-three ministers
and out of them, seventeen have political roots in the RSS and
there is only one Muslim (woman) in the cabinet who is in charge
of Minority Affairs (i.e., Muslim affairs), a gesture of tokenism that
slapped irony in the face for some. In asking, “how the king
(Narendra Modi) be guided by his raj guru (the RSS)?” the
editorial team of the left-leaning Economic and Political Weekly
concludes:
Narendra Modi is, after all, beholden to both the RSS and big
business—dharma and artha (the latter, the desire to accumulate
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material wealth). So it will all depend on how the RSS, the selfanointed

spiritual

counsellor

of

the rashtra,

preserves

the dharma even as it accommodates the artha. The king, in its
view, must be guided by the raj guru in the preservation of the
ideology of Hindutva nationalism.11
Will Modi be a pragmatist by defying his “raj guru” and
govern from the political center where he would inhabit a
moderate ideological space? Or will he still be a “Hindutvadi”
who will reap political and material dividend based on the
electoral mandate that he secured to exacerbate the communal
divide and income inequality? Only the near future will tell.
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